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Abstract 
This theoretical paper is published by the EUCPN Secretariat in connection with the 
theme of the Dutch Presidency, which is trafficking in illicit firearms. With the terrorist 
attacks that shook Europe the past months in hindsight, the subject is more relevant 
than ever. Trafficking in illicit firearms is a dangerous and deadly business, which should 
not be taken lightly. Because of the cross-border aspect of trafficking in illicit firearms, it 
is important to have a global overview. Where do the weapons come from, how do they 
enter the illicit market and what are the modus operandi of the traffickers?  
This paper should function as a base for a more prevention-orientated manual in which 
we will look at the difficulties and attempts to prevent trafficking in illicit firearms. 
Furthermore we will focus at the main international weapons and what the international 
agencies already do against the phenomenon.  
Through these actions, we hope to raise awareness concerning trafficking in illicit 
firearms, to exchange good practices and hopefully to propose general guidelines for a 
trafficking in illicit firearms policy. 
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Trafficking in Illicit Firearms 
1.  Definition 
Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are being called the weapons of mass destruction 
of this era. Of course in the big cities of Europe this is of a different order than in areas of 
conflict like the Middle-East, however it is still problematic, because in the hands of the 
wrong person, firearms can, and will, be deadly. For example the firearms violence 
between juvenile gangs in London, but also more recently the terrorist attack on the 
satiric weekly paper Charlie Hebdo and after that the series of terrorist attacks on 
November 13th that both happened in Paris. These are just a few examples of the 
problematic situation around illicit firearms. The United Nations Firearms Protocol defines 
the illicit trafficking in firearms as such:  
““Illicit trafficking” shall mean the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement 
or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the 
territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties 
concerned does not authorize it in accordance with the terms of this Protocol or if the 
firearms are not marked in accordance with article 8 of this Protocol.”1  
The illicit trafficking in firearms is often being named in the same sentence and is closely 
linked with other illegal activities such as drug smuggling, trafficking in human beings, 
financial crimes, terrorism, gang violence etc. The firearms trade causes more social and 
political problems than economic problems because of the durability of firearms, one can 
be in circulation for several decades.  
There are also discrepancies between national and international legislation. Players in the 
trade find themselves in a grey area because the legal qualification is not clear: is it legal 
or illegal? The question is which legal base is being used: national or international 
legislation. National authorized transactions are not always legal transactions, they can 
be in conflict with own national legislation or wider international legislation. An example 
is when Wallonia, the southern part of Belgium, allowed weapon deliveries to the 
Khadafy-regime while on a federal level there was being raised awareness for the human 
rights situation in Libya2. 
2.  A global overview  
It is being estimated that in the regions of the United Nations there are 640 million illicit 
firearms in circulation, which is around 1 illicit firearm per 11 people. Yearly around 
500.000 people die as a result of the use of illicit firearms; whereof 300.000 die in armed 
conflicts. Still around 8 million legal firearms are being produced every year3. Most 
                                                          
1 Article 3 Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition,      supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 31 
May 2001.  
2 Amnesty International (2014). Wapens en gerelateerde goederen (Thematische Fiche). Antwerp: Amnesty 
International, p.3. Retrieved from 
https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/VERK2014_03_WAPENSENGERELATEERDEGOEDEREN_17-3.pdf  
3 Fijnaut, C. (2008). De bestrijding van de illegale vuurwapenhandel. Het beleid van de Verenigde Naties en de 
Europese Unie. Justitiële Verkenningen, 34(4), pp. 9-28. Retrieved from: 
https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/jv200804-illegale-wapenhandel.aspx  
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firearms will be produced and traded legally, and will only later on arrive in the illegal 
circuit.  
A significant limitation to collecting and analyzing reliable data on the number of illicit 
firearms seizures is the absence in all Member States of central databases for reporting 
information on recovered firearms and ballistic material4. Using data retrieved from 
www.gunpolicy.org we can compare the Member States with each other. Below, in 
Graphic 1, 2 numbers have been set out. The rear bars are the estimates for civilian 
firearm possession per 100 civilians5. This estimate contains both licit and illicit firearms. 
It is important to remember that illicit firearms cannot be counted. So in this category, 
only estimates can be attempted. The bar in front of this one gives an estimate of the 
registered number of firearms in given country6. This estimate is also not perfectly 
reliable, since the data is sometimes dated and gunpolicy.org uses the last available 
data7. The two estimates can be subtracted from each other, the difference that remains 
will be a rough estimation of the number of illicit firearms in given country. 
                                                          
4 European Commission (2014). Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit 
Firearms Trafficking in the EU (Final Report). Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, p.20. 
(Hereafter: Impact Assessment Report (2014). Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-
_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf  
5 Alpers, Philip, Amélie Rossetti and Leonardo Goi. 2016. Guns in France: Rate of Civilian Firearm Possession 
per 100 Population. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. 
Accessed 9 March 2016. at: 
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/66/rate_of_civilian_firearm_possession/18,28,46,48,49,50,61,65,
69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192 
6 Alpers, Philip, Amélie Rossetti and Leonardo Goi. 2016. Guns in France: Rate of Registered Firearms per 100 
Population. Sydney School of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 
March 2016. at: 
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/66/rate_of_registered_firearms_per_100_population/18,28,46,48,
49,50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192  
7 In Malta and Denmark, for example, there are more registered firearms than there are licit and illicit firearms 
according to this graphic, which is not possible. This is because the data is dated. See Annex 1 for exact dates 
and numbers. 
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Graphic 2: Annual Firearm Deaths 
It immediately stands out that Finland has most firearms per civilian. To be exact 45 
firearms (licit/illicit) per 100 population. The data for firearm possession is not enough to 
suggest whether or not firearm possession is problematic in a given country, since this is 
dependent on different factors. In Graphic 28 the number of firearm related deaths in a 
given country are set out. 
 
Now, Graphic 1 and Graphic 2 can be compared. At this point we should be careful with 
drawing conclusions, but we can interpret the numbers. Finland ranks the highest in 
firearm deaths and in firearm possession. They have easy access to firearms, and tend to 
use them quicker when intoxicated9. The same goes for Croatia, they score above 
average on firearm possession, and they score high on firearm deaths. Estonia and 
Lithuania score low on firearm possession, but high on firearm related deaths, therefore 
the number of deaths per firearm is high. Sweden, for example, ranks third in firearm 
possession, but in firearm deaths Sweden ranks twelfth. On average they possess more 
firearms than other countries, however they have an average number of deaths by 
firearms compared to other countries. The same goes for Germany and Portugal.  
This indicates that there are discrepancies between countries in their firearm possession 
and firearm deaths, but a high number of firearm possession does not implicitly mean a 
high number of firearm deaths. Other factors need to be taken into account. Now we 
have given a global overview on the scale of the firearms market and the deaths that go 
with it. In a next part we will explore who are the main actors of this market. 
                                                          
8 Alpers, P. & Wilson, M. (2016). Guns in Germany: Rate of All Gun Deaths per 100,000 People. Sydney School 
of Public Health, The University of Sydney. GunPolicy.org, 23 February. Accessed 9 March 2016. at: 
http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/compare/69/rate_of_all_gun_deaths_per_100_000_people/18,28,46,48,49,
50,61,65,69,71,81,86,99,112,104,125,148,149,152,163,247,177,172,192  
9 Yle Uutiset News (21.12.2015). Something terrible has happened”: Does Finland need to wake up to its gun 
problem? Retrieved from: 
http://yle.fi/uutiset/something_terrible_has_happened_does_finland_need_to_wake_up_to_its_gun_problem/8
535425 
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2.1. Demand: Two markets 
There are a lot of reasons why someone would want to possess firearms: for criminal 
purposes; ideological purposes; for collecting; hunting or for leisure purposes. In this 
part, two of the most important criminal demand markets will be discussed, which are 
Organized Crime Groups and Political Groups.  
2.1.1. Organized Crime Groups 
We can distinguish between direct and indirect damage caused by the criminal use of 
firearms. The number of killings, the direct impact, in the EU alone was over 10.000 the 
first decade of the 21st century, and an additional 4.000 suicides by firearm each year10. 
The indirect impact is the use of firearms by organized crime groups (OCG’s) involved in 
the illegal drugs market and trafficking in human beings to intimidate and coerce their 
victims, which cannot be measured. There are clear connections between the trafficking 
in illicit firearms and OCG’s, such as: carrying firearms as an intrinsic aspect of trafficking 
operations; transnational criminal networks that to some extent specialize in illicit 
firearms trafficking; and the already mentioned intimidation of victims and self-defense 
by local and national gangs11. These three categories are likely to co-exist.  
The 2011 Europol Review showed that the possession of firearms by OCG’s is rising in 
Europe. They are forming a significant threat to themselves, the general public and law 
enforcement personnel because of their willingness to misuse these firearms. Civilians 
are often caught in the crossfire between rival gangs. Most OCG’s prefer firearms, but we 
can also notice an upward trend in the use of SALW such as the AK-47 and explosive 
devices.  The OCG’s rely on the commercial rules of supply and demand. Areas in which 
SALW are prohibited and areas of conflict present business opportunities for OCG’s. For 
example Russian and Italian criminal organizations were dealing in illicit firearms in the 
midst of the Yugoslav conflicts12. 
2.1.2. Political Groups 
Whereas OCG’s are part of the market that buys firearms for criminal purposes, there is 
also a market that buys firearms for political ones, which emerges when a set of militants 
finds the resources to equip an unauthorized force, which is of a lesser extent in the EU 
than in areas of conflict such as the Middle-East and Africa. Three separatist movements 
in Europe that belong in this category and remain heavily armed are: the Northern 
Ireland paramilitary groups, the Spanish ETA group and the Corsican nationalist 
movements. They possess vast arsenals of weapons, which OCG’s do not require.  
According to Europol’s recently published ‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report’ (TE-
SAT 2013), an increased use of firearms has been observed across a variety of terrorist 
and extremist groups. Thus, “terrorists and violent extremists have also been found in 
possession of a significant amount of firearms and ammunition over the reporting period. 
The use of firearms by terrorists and violent extremists has increased in recent years. 
This modus operandi appears to be emerging across a range of ideologies and is of 
                                                          
10 UNODC (2011). Global study on homicide: trends, context, data. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf  
11 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.31. 
12 Hurst, C., Mariani, B. & Davis, I. (2001). Organized crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an 
enlarged EU. London: Saferworld, p.25. Retrieved from: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-
resource/76-organised-crime-corruption-and-illicit-arms-trafficking-in-an-enlarged-eu  
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concern”13. The number of terrorist attacks and use of firearms kept increasing in 201414. 
Furthermore, when looking at the recent events, this can also be stated by 2015 and the 
beginning of 2016.  
In a key stakeholder15 survey from the European Commission some questions were 
asked about the illicit firearms market. One of them can be viewed in Table 1, below16.  
Table 1: “Who are the main groups involved in illicit firearms trafficking in your 
country?” 
Options 
Most Important Least Important 
Nº % Nº % 
Terrorists 3 3.8 8 10 
Organized 
Criminal 
Groups 
12 15 1 1.3 
Non-Organized 
Criminal 
Groups 
4 5 5 6.3 
No answer 61 73.3 66 82.5 
Total 80 100 80 100 
 
Twelve stakeholders answered that OCG’s are the most important actors in trafficking 
illicit firearms, and one stakeholder answered that OCG’s were the least important actors. 
Only 3 stakeholders answered that Terrorists are the most important actors in trafficking 
illicit firearms, and 8 answered that they were the least important. Since OCG’s use 
firearms to protect their illegal activities and to establish a base of income, they can be a 
serious threat to security within the EU. Dr. Domitilla Sagramoso describes the threat as 
such:  
“Although the influx of weapons into the European Union (EU) is not overwhelming, there 
is a regular trickle of small arms primarily from the Balkan region, as well as from 
Eastern Europe, which could increase as the EU and the Schengen Rim both expand to 
the east and south-east. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact 
and the wars in former Yugoslavia have resulted in a relaxation of border controls and an 
excess supply of light weapons, some of which have found their way into Europe. Small 
arms and light weapons (SALW) have fed the local criminal underworld as well as 
European terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA, thus contributing to the undermining of 
West European public safety.”17 
                                                          
13 Europol (2013). EU Terrorism Situation and Trends Report 2013, p.7. (Hereafter: TE-SAT). Retrieved from: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2013-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report  
14 Europol (2015). TE-SAT 2015, p.9. Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/european-union-
terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2015  
15
 Stakeholders are for example law enforcement agencies, national authorities, entities covered by the UN 
Firearms Protocol, judges, public prosecutors and academics.  
16 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.151. 
17 Sagramoso, D. (2001). The proliferation of illegal small arms and light weapons in and around the European 
Union: instability,        organized crime and terrorist group. London: Saferworld & Centre for Defense Studies, 
p.5. Retrieved from: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/77-the-proliferation-of-illegal-
small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-and-around-the-european-union (Hereafter: Sagramoso (2001)) 
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If there is demand, either from political groups or OCG’s, there must be supply according 
to the commercial rules of the market. Where do the firearms come from and how do 
they enter the illicit market if most of the firearms are produced legally? We will look at 
just that in the following chapter.  
3.  Logistics 
3.1. Supply of the illicit market 
The supply of firearms which are being trafficked illicitly since the 1990’s can be 
originated to three main sources, which have replaced each other: 
- First of all the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were a source of illicit 
firearms in the aftermath of the collapse of the iron curtain; 
- Then, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, the Western Balkans became an 
important source of illicit firearms; 
- More recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons 
available and following some of the main drug trafficking routes into the EU.18 
As an example we can name the Soviet Army’s military base in Estonia. At the end of the 
1980’s, when the communist regime was collapsing and the control over the Soviet 
Army’s weaponry decreased, a considerable number of firearms and military equipment 
were illegally obtained by some of the civilians residing in Estonia when the Soviet Union 
left. They exchanged money, alcohol, food and other goods for Kalashnikov rifles, 
Makarov pistols and ammunition. The number of weapons using this scheme range from 
several hundreds to several thousands19. This is just one of the ways how licit weapons 
enter the illicit market. We can distinguish between 7 different ways. The following 
diagram, obtained from Spapens (2007), gives a clear view in the logistical progress of 
the illicit market: 
 
                                                          
18 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 34.  
19 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 35. 
Figure 1: Licit to illicit (Spapens 2007) 
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3.1.1. Illicit production 
In the upper left corner of Figure 1, you can see the ‘Illicit production’. Although an 
estimated 95% of the illicit firearms seized in the Netherlands between 1998-2000 could 
be traced back to a legal manufacturer20, there remains a small portion that is being 
produced in an illicit way. This can occur in three ways: original designs are being 
manufactured at home or in workshops by amateurs; illicit copies of existing designs are 
produced in factories and third; the production of legitimate arms manufacturers is 
fraudulently diverted21. Amateurs tend to get handy when it comes to crafting firearms: 
At the end of the 90’s guns were seized that looked like key chains throughout Europe. In 
1999 the Dutch police seized 135 of these handcrafted weapons, whose bullets are 
smaller, but are nonetheless deadly. The weapons probably came from Bulgaria22. A 
second way of illicit production is the production of firearms in a legal twilight area. This 
happened for example during the wars between the countries of the former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990’s, when several small scale weapons factories were set up in Croatia to be able 
to meet the great demand for weapons independently of foreign countries. These 
weapons, so called ‘Croatian Uzi’s’ were found in the Dutch criminal world between 1998-
200023. Thirdly, firearms can be illicitly manufactured by legitimate arms producers which 
is only possible when internal controls are defective at these manufacturers. In this way 
FN pistols that were completely identical to the legally manufactured weapons but lacking 
serial numbers or test-bench marks appeared regularly in the Netherlands24. A thorough 
investigation revealed that some of the employees had stolen components in order to 
assemble them into working weapons at home. 
3.1.2. Leakage from the factory 
Besides the illicit production it is more common that the firearms are produced licit and 
due to fraud or theft of complete weapons from the factory they enter the illicit market 
before they were transported to the buyers. A Yugoslav residing in the Netherlands was 
arrested in 1996 on the German-Austrian border at Passau with 200 pistols in his van, 
which leaked from the Zastava company in Belgrade. It was not his first time: previously 
he already smuggled a few hundred weapons to the Netherlands and had sold them on to 
criminals. When his house was searched they found the original packaging complete with 
warranty certificates25. In this regard the EUCPN network got the assignment in 2010 to 
develop a handbook including guidelines for national authorities in order to prevent thefts 
of firearms at critical distribution points26. 
3.1.3. Fake exports  
One of the most lucrative methods of transferring firearms from the licit to the illicit 
market is fake export, because it happens in large quantities and depends on corruption 
                                                          
20 Krause, K. (2000). Small Arms and Light Weapons: Proliferation Processes and Policy Options. Canada: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, p.18. Retrieved from: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org  
21 Spapens, A. C. M. (2007). Trafficking in Illicit Firearms for Criminal Purposes within the European Union. 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 15(3), 359-381, p.363. Retrieved from: 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/923753/fulltext.pdf  (Hereafter: Spapens (2007)) 
22 Kuijper, R. & Leest, Van der, S. (2002). Vuurwapencriminaliteit op basis van het Vuurwapendatasysteem in 
2001. Zoetermeer: Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, Landelijk Bureau Wapens en Munitie, p. 11. 
23 Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2002). Vuurwapens gezocht: vuurwapengebruik, -bezit en -handel in 
Nederland 1998-2000. Tilburg. Retrieved from: https://www.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/aard-en-omvang-
van-de-vuurwapencriminaliteit.aspx  
24 Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (1997). De aard en omvang van vuurwapencriminaliteit in Nederland, 
periode 1991-1995. Zoetermeer. 
25 Spapens (2007) p. 365. 
26 Council of the European Union (2010). Draft European Action Plan to combat illegal trafficking in so called 
“heavy” firearms  which could be used or are used in criminal activities. Brussels: 29 November 2010, p.10. 
Retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/118171.pdf  
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in the country of destination. If the applicable export requirements are met, firearms can 
legally be delivered to foreign purchasers. A central role here is being played by the ‘end-
user-certificates’, whereby the receiving country guarantee that the transaction is 
legitimate. This is why it depends on corruption, since the end-user-certificate must be 
bribed. Then the ‘transaction’ can take place, which only happens on paper while the 
weapons disappear with an unknown destination.  
Another case of false documentation appeared in the course of 2012, when authorities 
identified a new trend in the illegal trade of firearms and ammunition involving legal 
entities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Companies registered in 
compliance with domestic law and the regulations appeared to engage in illegal sales of 
firearms and ammunition, however they were found to be falsifying documentation, such 
as through false declarations of theft, in order to facilitate illicit exports27. 
Normally they choose a country that is not in the possibility to check if the weapons 
arrived. But they can also be exported directly from the producing country to unknown 
destinations. The Croatian company HS, for example, sold 3700 pistols to post-office box 
companies in the United States, Nigeria and the British Virgin Islands. These weapons 
never arrived, but where confiscated in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, 
Denmark, Spain and the Czech Republic28. 
A last case of fake exportation that needs to be discussed is exportation via detours. 
Weapons are delivered by the factory to a broker, who can export the weapons on paper 
to another country of destination if he has the required licenses. An example is when 
firearms were purchased from various foreign manufacturers by two Belgian arms 
dealers in 1998. They were sold on paper to a Dutch broker who ‘exported’ them, but 
they already entered the illicit domain from Belgium. Using this technique, some Belgian 
arms dealers diverted a few tens of thousands firearms29. Because of the large amounts 
they were also smuggled outside the EU. To this day, some of these weapons are still 
emerging all over Europe. 
3.1.4. Conversion of non-lethal firearms 
A fourth way is the conversion of non-lethal firearms to lethal barreled firearms for the 
purpose of selling them in the criminal milieu. This happens on a large scale since non-
lethal firearms are freely available and some types can be converted quite easily through 
a couple adaptions. An example is the conversion of a gas- or an alarm pistol. They are, 
however, less reliable and potentially dangerous for the user since the materials are not 
designed to withstand the higher gas pressure that occurs with live ammunition. Besides 
that, the converted firearms have not been subject to tests on test benches30.  In the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia this form of trafficking was identified. Authorities 
reported the trafficking of gas or signal pistols initially purchased abroad and 
subsequently converted in the country to fire explosive ammunition. The converted 
firearms then sell within the country for €100-€150 each or are trafficked to other 
                                                          
27 UNODC (2015). Study on firearms 2015. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p.50. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf (Hereafter: UNODC 
(2015)) 
28 Information provided by the Bundeskriminalamt during the European Firearms Experts Meeting, Noordwijk, 7 
and 8 December 2004. 
29 Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (1997). De aard en omvang van vuurwapencriminaliteit in Nederland, 
periode 1991-1995.      Zoetermeer.  
30 Spapens (2007), p.366. 
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European countries where they are sold for approximately €300-€50031. Another 
common example of this situation is the modification of gas pistols that can be purchased 
without a permit in Latvia and transferred to another country (e.g. Estonia or Lithuania, 
or the UK) where they are modified32 
Furthermore there are more ways to convert firearms. They can be converted in a 
physical matter, as described above, but they can also be converted in a legal matter. If 
a government decides that a previously legal firearm should be illegal, a whole category 
of firearms becomes illegal and are, by law, subject to the illicit market. 
3.1.5. Recycling of discarded weapons,  re-use of the surplus parts and 
3D printing 
A fifth way of obtaining illicit firearms is by recycling weapons that have been withdrawn 
from service, in other words, have been neutralized. In Germany and Austria, for 
example, there are wholesale firms that buy up scrapped firearms by the lot and have 
them converted to alarm pistols or to deactivated weapons for decoration. Criminal gangs 
soon figured out that these weapons could be reactivated into lethal firearms33. This 
process has been happening in Europe for several decades now. In 2004 the Dutch police 
seized Walther’s PP’s (James Bond’s pistol) that had been used by the Swedish police. 
Soon after they discovered34 that Sweden sold a lot of these firearms to a German junk 
dealer a similar case happened in different European countries. Makarov pistols were 
turning up left and right in Europe and it turned out that these pistols had been used by 
the East-German police and had been sold to an Austrian junk dealer, who converted 
them into alarm pistols. A Croatian group succeeded in buying considerable numbers of 
these pistols and converting them back to lethal weapons. The German 
Bundeskriminalamt estimates that some 9000 Makarov, FEG, and Tokarev pistols have 
been recycled of which some 400 have been seized in Western-Europe up to the end of 
200435. 
In a similar way, weapons from surplus lots for which there was no more use leak into 
the criminal circuit. The Dutch police investigated a Croatian criminal gang that smuggled 
weapons to the Netherlands. These weapons were from different type of brands that 
were left over from the conflicts in the ‘90’s. Another example is when the British weapon 
law was tightened in 1997 and legal arms dealers were left with weapons they could not 
sell. A few criminals let them leak into the illicit market and a few years later they began 
to appear in the Dutch underworld36. 
Furthermore one more way of recycling weapons needs to be mentioned. The advances 
in technology increases the risk that sectors that used to be unable to obtain illicit 
firearms, now are able to gain access to them. 3D printing, for example, can be used to 
manufacture firearms and produce essential components to reactivate deactivated 
firearms37. The world’s first gun made with 3D printing technology was fired for the first 
                                                          
31 UNODC (2015), p.51. 
32 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.14. 
33 Spapens (2007), p.366. 
34
 With information obtained through Interpol 
35 Information provided by staff of the Bundeskriminalamt during the European Firearms Experts Meeting, 
Noordwijk, 7 and 8 December 2004. 
36 Spapens, A.C.M. & Bruinsma, M.Y. (2004). Illegale vuurwapens in Nederland: smokkel en handel. 
Politiewetenschap (26). Zeist: Uitgeverij Kerckebosch, pp. 71-73. Retrieved from: 
http://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/download/72GgOfZ7kOIbBm4jqAz77y8JBqFvzmrBXWwn6SGf/Ptf5pWFBWv
Qf4iqSsU7PCfMa5nNcHwZFk8rxgTqo/ (Hereafter: Spapens & Bruinsma (2014)) 
37 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p. 35.  
Theoretical Paper Trafficking in Illicit Firearms                               
 
 
13 
time in 2014, in the United States. The gun was printed from separate printed 
components made from ABS plastic, except the firing pin, which was made out of 
metal38. 3D technology works by building layer upon layer of, usually, plastic to build 
solid objects. This new technology poses a major risk, because the 3D printers become 
cheaper and more accessible for certain parts of society where we would rather not see 
the use of this kind of technology, especially if it involves lethal weapons. 
3.1.6. Theft or fraud from legal dealers or private owners of legal 
firearms 
Stocks of legally-held firearms are vulnerable to loss, theft or unauthorized misuse. 
Whether they are being held privately, by the police, armed forces or other government 
agencies, some degree of vulnerability of authorized holdings is inevitable. Moreover, 
national regulatory requirements for secure storage and regular stock checks and 
reporting are not always stringent or actively enforced39.  
Besides theft, there is also a possibility that the legal dealers or private owners 
intentionally subverted the firearms by filing a false report of theft, also for insurance 
reasons, while the firearm was actually sold illicitly: ‘double the money’. An example is 
when in 1998, Germany, there were 6.405 firearms reported stolen or lost by private 
owners40. How many of these weapons end up in the criminal environment is impossible 
to trace. Just as it is impossible to trace if the owners committed fraud or that they were, 
in fact, stolen. It occurs not only from private individuals, but also from dealers. An 
example is when a criminal gang in the Netherlands carried out a series of ram raids on 
arms stores and got away with dozens of weapons41. Another example is when, at the 
end of the 1990’s, 138 Glock pistols disappeared from the customs warehouse at 
Schiphol. They were waiting for shipment to Nicaragua and were temporarily stored. The 
shipper had not reported this theft to the Dutch authorities and the incident came only to 
light by chance42.  
  
                                                          
38 BBC News (6.5.2013). Working gun made with 3D Printer. Retrieved from:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22421185  
39 Spapens (2007), p.368. 
40 Sagramoso (2001), p.17. 
41 Spapens & Bruinsma (2004), p.91. 
42 Spapens (2007), p.368. 
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3.2. Firearm routes 
When the weapons are produced and have entered the illicit market, they also follow 
different routes to enter the country of destination.  The transfers of illicit firearms 
happen in a variety of different ways and by the use of different intermediaries. Methods 
range from transfers on an individual level, small groups or firms who break the law 
deliberately, but also transfers that are facilitated by governments or state officials. 
Corruption plays a large role on different levels in the trafficking in illicit firearms43. 
Besides these actors there is a large part of the illicit firearms trade that is being 
facilitated by OCG’s. Motorcycle gangs, for example, have opened charters in the 
Western-Balkans and use existing criminal routes to traffic firearms. The illicit firearms 
trafficking is almost exclusively a supplementary rather than a primarily source of income 
for the OCG’s involved in this business44. As mentioned before, the firearms trade goes 
hand in hand with drug-smuggling, trafficking of human beings and other illegal 
businesses. The OCG’s enter the illicit firearm trafficking business through other criminal 
activity; they expand their contacts and get knowledge about smuggling routes and 
infrastructure. The limited research that is available estimates that 80% of the illicit 
trafficking in firearms within the European Union has a destination within the European 
Union itself. 
3.2.1. Inside Europe 
In Figure 245, below, the weapon flows in Europe are given, based on input from several 
European countries46.  
                                                          
43
 For more information on corruption in Europe, we kindly refer you to the monitor about corruption written 
by the EUCPN Secretariat. This monitor can be found here: http://eucpn.org/document/european-crime-
prevention-monitor-2014  
44
 Impact Assessment Report (2014), p.33. 
45
 COM (2013) 716 final. Firearms and the internal security of the EU: protecting citizens and disrupting illegal 
Trafficking. Brussels: 21.10.2013. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/trafficking-in-firearms/docs/1_en_act_part1_v12.pdf 
46 Based on input from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Estonia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
Figure 2: Firearm Routes Inside Europe 
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As we can see, the reactivation of firearms and the conversion of alarm pistols are 
common methods of converting the firearms and trafficking them inside Europe. In 
Partizánske, Slovakia, there is a shop located in a basement called AFG Security which is 
the source of thousands of deactivated weapons that have been sold across Europe47. 
These firearms ended up in the hands of terrorists in France, gangsters in Great Britain 
and neo-Nazi’s in Germany. Looking at the online store http://www.afg-defense.eu/ 
there is a wide variety of deactivated army weapons for sale. The AFG website continues 
to claim that the weapons are just "for fun" -- for the reenactment of World War II 
battles, for example, but the key part comes later: "Most of the expansion weapons (Eds. 
Note: alarm weapons) are originals (originally 'sharp') with minor modifications which 
disable the shooting with original - 'sharp' ammunition." The word "sharp," refers to the 
ability to fire live ammunition48. Companies like Kol Arms bought containers of these 
decommissioned weapons from the Slovak military and converted them from lethal 
weapons into alarm rifles. When these weapons left AFG Security, they were considered 
harmless by law. According to the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) they sold 
14,000 alarm weapons abroad over the internet. It took a French locksmith only 2 hours 
to reopen the barrel and thus reactivate it. These easily converted alarm pistols are a hot 
and easy market for criminals and terrorists49. Figure 350 gives a clear view on the flows 
of deactivated firearms which can easily be reactivated, and the flows of lethal firearms 
to Western Europe. According to a European Investigative Collaboration51 some 
reactivated firearms (with a hallmark from the Slovakian Kol Arms manufacturer, 
mentioned above) found their way to a kosher supermarket in Paris and were used for 
taking 17 people hostage, and killing 3 people52. According to the same European 
Investigative Collaboration some Kalashnikovs found their way from the Balkan area via 
                                                          
47 Candea, S., Dahlkamp, J., Schmitt, J., Ulrich, A. & Wiedmann-Schmidt, W. (2016). The Path to Death: How 
EU Failures Helped Paris Terrorists Obtain Weapons. Retrieved from: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-the-path-of-the-paris-terror-weapons-a-1083461.html 
(Hereafter: Candea, S. et al. (2016))  
48 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 
49 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 
50 Figure 3 retrieved from Candea, S. et al., (2016) at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/following-
the-path-of-the-paris-terror-weapons-a-1083461.html  
51
 Spiegel (24.3.2016). European Investigative Collaboration: DER SPIEGEL and Eight Other Media Found 
Investigative Network. Retrieved from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/der-spiegel-and-eight-other-
media-found-investigative-network-a-1084054.html 
52
 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 
Figure 3: Firearm routes to Western Europe (Spiegel.de) 
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the lethal firearms routes, as displayed below, to Paris where they left 90 people dead, 
and hundreds injured.  
3.2.2. Balkan’s Bazar 
The dissolution of the former Soviet-Union left the remaining countries with huge stocks 
of firearms. The destruction of these weapons is an expensive cost, and until this day 
there remain stockpiles of functional firearms. After the dissolution, Ukraine inherited 
30% of the Soviet-military complex. The country now holds the third-largest stockpile in 
the world with an estimated 7 million firearms, after China and the Russian Federation53. 
Since the early 90’s this has proven to be a lucrative market for firearms trafficking; 
especially for states in Africa involved in regional conflicts. Africa experienced a bloody 
decade, and the surplus weapons from the Balkans were the fuel for the fire. According 
to the head of the Ukrainian parliamentary commission investigating cases of illegal arms 
and munitions sales, Between 1992 and 1997 approximately 28 billion euro’s worth of 
military equipment and munitions was stolen and illegally sold abroad54. 
Just like many Balkan countries, Bulgaria has massive warehouses filled with stockpiles 
of old guns. The standard practice for these countries had been to sell whatever they 
could and to destroy what was left over. The same goes for Romania (surplus of 1.25 
million firearms), Albania (259,000), Serbia (90,000) and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(53,000)55. These are only the weapons found in government arsenals. This nuance is an 
important one, because in 1997 Albanians plundered their army’s warehouses, steeling 
550,000 weapons and more than 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition. Weapon supplies of 
private individuals could be larger than those of the government arsenals56. The Balkan 
countries did not choose for these weapon supplies that they got from the Soviet Union, 
so deactivating or destroying them is an international responsibility. The EU and UN 
donated a few million euro’s to destroy the firearms in the Balkans, but this did not come 
close to the amount of money and effort that was needed to destroy the entire 
stockpiles.  
Figure 557(p. 15) gives a case study of Romania, a country located far east in the 
Balkans. It gives the percentages of all the seized firearms and distinguishes between the 
country of manufacture, the country of destination and the country of departure. It 
becomes clear that most of the firearms are manufactured in Europe (Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Bulgaria) and Turkey (30%). An interesting fact is that Spain (24%) and Turkey 
almost have the same manufacture percentage, which means firearms travel both ways 
in and out of Europe.  Most of the firearms were destined for Romania (80%), and some 
for Italy (18%). It is plausible that the seized firearms in Romania were destined for Italy 
and manufactured in Turkey and were only passing through Romania. The ‘departure’ 
country is the country where the traffic route starts. Countries of departure are Germany, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain (Total: 46.5%) and Bulgaria (29.1%). When we look at the 
data and at the geographic location of these countries it becomes clear that the firearms 
depart from South-Western Europe to Romania and from Bulgaria to Romania, so the 
firearms enter the country from both ways.  
                                                          
53 UNODC (2010). Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. Vienna: United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 142. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf (Hereafter: UNODC (2010)) 
54 UNODC (2010), p. 145.  
55 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 
56 Candea, S. et al. (2016). 
57 UNODC (2015), p. 54. 
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3.2.3. Dark Markets 
In the 21st century, with the extension and modernization of the internet and the online-
world new ways of buying, selling and shipping illegal firearms have established. These 
are markets that initially cannot be reached without certain browser programs, like Tor58. 
The ‘normal’ internet blocks these markets out. Buyers and sellers of illegal firearms can 
use these as a base for their sell or purchase because, until recently, they thought they 
could not be traced and they paid with Bitcoins59. In a Q&A by Vocativ, with a seller from 
the dark market, he sheds some light about the shipping methods they wield:  
“Our favorite is power tools. Take the tool apart, mill out space for the firearm 
component and seal it back up. If done carefully, the item can even continue to operate. 
We’ve used Drills, saws, other power tools, tanks, engines, computers, furniture, and 
even some items costing well over several thousand dollars. The key is to find an item 
that has a similar density to the metal as to skew the X-ray taken in customs. Not a 
complete preventative measure, but it helps.”60 
                                                          
58 Tor, an acronym for The Onion Router, is a free network designed to anonymize your real Internet Protocol 
(IP) address by routing your traffic through many servers of the Tor network. Tor is used by a variety of people 
for both illicit and licit purposes. 
59 Untraceable, electronic money. 
60 Matthews, S. (24.2.2014). Q&A With a Deep Web Arms Dealer. Vocativ. Retrieved from: 
http://www.vocativ.com/tech/bitcoin/q-deep-web-arms-dealer/  
Figure 5: Seized Firearms in Romania, 2013 
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In 2014, on November 6, 16 European countries61, alongside counterparts from the 
United States, brought down several marketplaces as part of a unified international 
action from Europol’s operational center in the Hague62. This action aimed to stop the 
sale, distribution and promotion of illicit firearms, and other harmful items like drugs 
which were being sold on a Dark Market. Operation Onymous resulted in 17 arrests of 
vendors and administrators running these online marketplaces and more than 410 hidden 
services being taken down, alongside with the dark market Silk Road 2.063. In addition, 
bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold and 
silver were seized.  
  
                                                          
61 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
62 Europol (7.11.2014). Global action against dark markets on Tor Network. The Hague, The Netherlands. 
Retrieved from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tor-network 
(Hereafter: Europol (7.11.2014))  
63 Europol (7.11.2014). 
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4. Conclusion 
In this theoretical paper we have explored trafficking in illicit firearms. Firstly we put the 
definition of trafficking in illicit firearms that is being wielded by the UNODC into the 
context of this paper and after that a problem definition. It is clear that the firearms 
business is a big market, but usually comes alongside other markets like drugs or 
trafficking in human beings.  
In a second part there has been given a global overview of the issue illicit firearms for 
the member states. In this part the number of firearm possession and the number of 
registered firearms has been set out together, which gives a clearer view on the number 
of illicit firearms in a given country. After this the annual deaths by firearms have been 
set out for given countries. When these two graphics are compared, it gives a clearer 
view of the Member States were firearm possession is most problematic.  In a second 
part of the global overview the demand for illicit firearms focused on organized crime 
groups and political groups (terrorists). The OCG’s are the most important actors in 
trafficking in illicit firearms, however when in the hands of terrorists, the firearms cause 
more damage to innocent people.  
In the third part the logistics of the illicit firearm market have been explored. Firstly, in a 
continuation of the demand side, the supply side was treated. There are many different 
ways in how a firearm can enter the illicit market: from theft, to illicit production, to 
reactivation of deactivated firearms and the conversion of non-lethal firearms. Another 
part of logistics was the trafficking routes. With information from different publications 
we explored the trafficking routes inside Europe, the routes from the Balkans and lastly 
the dark markets, which is an increasing market can be seen as where the future expand 
will happen 
Because the trafficking in illicit firearms is periodically and is not a steady supply it is 
much harder to reveal these markets than, for example, drug markets. Firearms are only 
delivered when they are needed and the market does not work in a way that somewhere, 
for example every 2 weeks, a delivery happens.. To combat trafficking in illicit firearms 
member states should tighten their legislation on the area of non-lethal firearms and 
deactivate firearms better. Also, there should be invested in destroying the huge 
amounts of firearm remains that are left behind after the cold war because these 
weapons are waiting to be stolen, and almost literally are a ticking time bomb. Lastly, 
because of the modernization there should also be invested in shutting down online, 
untraceable markets. If this is the new way of order and delivery and buyers and sellers 
are negotiating freely over the world wide web, the investigation bureaus should be right 
on top of that to reveal large pieces of the market.  
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5. Annex 1: Data Graphic 1 
Country 
Firearm Possession Registered Firearms 
Firearms per 100 
pop. 
Date 
Firearms per 100 
pop. 
Date 
AT 30.4 2007 4.08 2015 
BE 17.2 2007 7.1 2014 
BG 19.4 2006 4.34 2015 
HR 21.7 2007 8.36 2015 
CY 36.4 2007 10.35 2015 
CZ 16.3 2007 6.94 2015 
DK 12 2007 15.98 2015 
EE 9.2 2007 3.53 2014 
FI 45.7 2007 30 2010 
FR 31.2 2007 4.44 2015 
DE 30.3 2007 8.73 2015 
EL 22.5 2007 0.94 2014 
HU 5.5 2007 2.1 2015 
IE 6.35 2014 3.73 2014 
IT 11.9 2007 - - 
LV 19 2007 2.48 2015 
LT 0.7 2007 2.16 2015 
LU 15.3 2007 4.16 2015 
MT 11.9 2007 12.75 2015 
NL 3.09 2007 2.02 2015 
PL 1.3 2007 1.3 2007 
PT 24.22 2015 13.04 2015 
RO 1.2 2006 0.28 2015 
SK 8.3 2007 3.14 2015 
SI 13.5 2007 5.08 2015 
ES 10.4 2007 6.98 2015 
SE 31.6 2007 23.09 2015 
UK 6.7 2007 3.43 2013 
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